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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 13-1756
______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JONATHAN TRIMINIO,
Appellant
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-12-00698-001)
Honorable Katherine S. Hayden, District Judge
______________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 8, 2013
BEFORE: FUENTES, GREENBERG, and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 23, 2013)
______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
______________
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from a judgment of
conviction and sentence entered on March 13, 2013, on the basis of appellant Jonathan
Triminio’s plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single count of unlawful

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
District Court sentenced Triminio to a 73-month custodial term to be followed by a threeyear term of supervised release. The Court calculated that Triminio had a final offense
level of 25 with 8 criminal history points, making an advisory sentencing range of 84 to
105 months. The offense level included a 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for unlawful possession of body armor.
Triminio appeals only from the use of this enhancement in calculating his offense
level as he claims that its use violated his due process rights because he was not
convicted of a body armor offense and he did not stipulate that he had possession of body
armor. He principally relies on Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348
(2000). He does not contend, however, that, in terms, the enhancement could not be
applied to his possession of body armor, though he does contend that his plea agreement
did not contemplate the use of the enhancement in the calculation of his sentencing level.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although, here, as in most
cases, we exercise an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a sentence, Triminio
contends that the District Court erred as a matter of law by including the 4-level body
armor enhancement in calculating his offense level and thus, to the extent of considering
that argument, we exercise plenary review.
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We will affirm. Triminio complains that the District Court, by finding as a fact
that he had possession of body armor, violated the rule that he contends that the cases he
cites established. But clearly the Court did not violate the principles recognized in those
cases. Although possession of body armor could have been charged as a separate offense
so that if a jury convicted him of that offense he could have been sentenced for its
commission, the government did not make any such charge. Rather, the government
referred to the body armor only as a basis for enhancement of Triminio’s guidelines
offense level and, in doing so, in no way permitted an increase in the statutory sentence
that could have been imposed on him or in any other way affected any mandatory
minimum or maximum sentence applicable to him. Here the maximum sentence – with
or without the 4-level enhancement – was ten years and the enhancement did not increase
any mandatory minimum that the Court was obliged to impose. Accordingly, the Court
by the use of the enhancement simply increased the advisory but not binding sentencing
range to which Triminio was subject. Thus, United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 559 (3d
Cir. 2007) (en banc), which held “that facts relevant to the advisory United States
Sentencing Guidelines need not be submitted to a jury” is controlling here and we are
constrained to affirm.
We make three additional comments. First, as we noted above, Triminio relies on
the very recent case of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). But that case
holds that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence for an offense] is an
‘element’ [of the offense] that must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 2155. Thus, it is the
counterpoint to Apprendi which held the same thing with respect to increases in the
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statutory maximum sentence for an offense. But Alleyne, like Apprendi, is not applicable
here because the body armor enhancement did not increase any mandatory minimum
sentence to which Triminio was subject. Second, we see nothing in the record that in any
way made it unfair for the District Court to use the enhancement in calculating his
offense level. To the contrary when the Court calculated his sentencing range it acted
consistently with the provisions of Triminio’s plea agreement.
Our final comment is that if Triminio is correct it is difficult to understand how a
district court ever can make a finding that is the basis for a guidelines sentencing level
enhancement. It is ironic that Triminio is making his argument in a case in which he does
not even claim that the District Court erred in its finding that he possessed body armor as
he does not deny being in possession of it.
For the foregoing reasons the order entered on March 13, 2013, will be affirmed.
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